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DON'T SHOOT THE MESSENGER: CIVIL
LIABILITY FOR ISPS AFTER VIRGINIA
DA CUNHA V. YAHoo! ARGENTINA
& GOOGLE INC.
Julieta Andrea Grinffiel*
I. INTRODUCTIONO N August 13, 2010, the National Court of Civil Appeals of Ar-
gentina (Cdmara Nacional de la Apelaciones en lo Civil de la
Capital Federal) reversed a 2009 lower court ruling that previ-
ously placed civil liability on Google Inc. and Yahoo! Argentina for the
illicit content found through their search engines.' The issue that this
appeal sought to resolve was whether Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
such as Google and Yahoo!, could be found civilly liable for the illicit
content created by third parties. 2 In a 2-1 decision, the National Court of
Civil Appeals declared that an ISP could be civilly liable for the contents
of a third party only if it had knowledge of the illegal content and failed
to take appropriate action.3 The decision left the injured party, Virginia
da Cunha, with the option of either bringing the illegal content to the
attention of the search engines so that it could be properly removed, or
bringing suit against the third party websites, many of which were created
anonymously. 4
Virginia da Cunha brought a civil suit against the two juggernauts,
Google Inc. and Yahoo! Argentina, in 2009 after she realized that when
her name was entered into their search engines, her image and her name,
neither of which she authorized to be used, would be included in websites
that contained "sexual, erotic, and pornographic content." 5 Virginia da
Cunha, relying on her right to privacy 6 and right to dignity and honor,7
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1. Cimara Nacional de la Apelaciones en lo Civil de la Capital Federal [CNCiv.], 13/
8/2010, "D.C., V. c/Yahoo de Argentina SRL y Otros/Dahios y Perjuicios," La Ley
[L.L.] (2010-E-107) (Arg.) at 2-3, available at http://www.diariojudicial.com.ar/
documentos/Agosto20lO/BandanaGoogle Yahoo.pdf [hereinafter Da Cunha].
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id. at 16, 19.
4. Id. at 22-23.
5. Id. at 2.
6. CONST. ARG. art. 19.
7. American Convention on Human Rights art. 11, Nov. 22, 1969, No.17955.
111
112 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 17
demanded that Google and Yahoo! not only remove the damaging links
and images, but also compensate her for the moral damage she suffered.8
The defendants insisted that they were simply offering information on
existing third-party websites and had no control over what information
was posted on the Internet, thus the legal action should have been
brought against those third-party websites instead.9 This paper will ana-
lyze the judges' holdings first by providing the legal background of Ar-
gentina's judicial system and the laws that govern the case (Part II), then
it will compare the analyses of the majority and the minority (Part 111-A
and III-B), and finally conclude with a discussion of the future implica-
tions that will arise out of this holding (Part III-C) that will undoubtedly
tilt the scale in favor of broader freedom of expression at the expense of
citizens' individual rights.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The key legal issue in this case was whether Google Inc. and Yahoo!
Argentina could be held civilly liable for their search engines' abilities to
access and display third-party websites and, therefore, link Virginia da
Cunha's "identity, image, and name"10 to those websites' "sexual, erotic,
and pornographic"" contents, resulting in the violation of her "highly
personal rights" 12 under Argentine law.' 3 Argentina recognizes the right
to freedom of expression,14 an individual's right to privacy,15 and the
right to his or her image,16 while providing moral damages when those
rights are violated.17 To better understand the analysis of the majority
and the minority, a brief overview into the Argentine legal system and
the applicable laws that govern the abovementioned rights is required.
A. THE ARGENTINE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Argentina is a civil law nation and as such, protection of certain rights
is found in the expansive set of rules that have developed through the
years by way of court interpretation of several statutes.18 Part of Argen-
tina's civil law tradition culminates in the infrequent application of stare
8. Virginia Simari, Primera condena a buscador por uso no autorizado de imdgenes
[First sentence for the search for an unauthorized use of images], HAIAS-
I)ATA.ORG, 30 de julio de 2009, available at http://www.habeasdata.org/wp/2009/07/
30/fallodacunha_v yahoo/.
9. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 3.
10. Id. at 7.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Guillermo Cabanellas, The Right of Publicity Under Argentine Law, 18 Lov. L.A.
EN-r. L.J. 449, 451 (1998).
13. CONs r. ARGi. art. 19.
14. American Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, No.17955.
15. CONs'r. ARG. art. 19.
16. Law No. 11.723, art. 31, Sept. 28, 1933 [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 443 (Arg.), available
at http://www.uacopi.org.ar/files/ley_1 1723.pdf.
17. Coo. Civ. [Civi. Coi] art. 1078 (Arg.), available at http://www.justiniano.com/
codigos.. juridicos/codigo-civilllibro2_secc2_titulo7al9.htm.
18. Cabanellas, supra note 12, at 449.
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decisis because courts are not required to follow court precedent and are
only required to follow the laws passed by the legislature.19 This in turn
causes the judges to create a myriad of guidelines that apply to narrow,
fact-specific legal questions. 20 According to Article 31 of the Argentine
Constitution, the only binding decisions are those decided by the Su-
preme Court (Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n) as the final inter-
preter of the law.2 1 The Argentine courts can contradict even their own
precedents as long as the analysis or the decision itself is not arbitrary or
incoherent. 22 In this instance, the judges of this court had to follow laws
divided into two categories: those that protect the freedom of expression
and those that protect against the unlawful and unauthorized use of an
individuals' image and provide for damages to the injured party. 23
B. THE MAJORITY VOTE
Two of the three judges, Judge Patricia Barbieri and Judge Ana Maria
R. Brilla de Serrat, agreed with the appellants in this action and freed
them from liability.24 First, the judges established that though there is no
legal standard for the specific regulation of ISPs, 2 5 freedom of expression
extends to the Internet and has the same considerations as other forms of
social communication. 26 The judges then stated that if the press exceeds
the proper limits of its freedom to inform, it incurs civil responsibility for
the abuse of that right.27 The judges then equated the ISPs' responsibility
to that of the press and appled the same standards that regulate its civil
responsibility. 28
When the press abuses its freedom of expression, it can be held either
objectively or subjectively responsible.29 It can be objectively responsible
and liable for the damages incurred by a third party under its control or
authority30 from the theory that the primary party created the risk that
led to the resulting damage. 31 Alternatively, a party can be deemed sub-
jectively responsible if it performs an action that, through either fault or
negligence, causes an injury.32 Before determining which law governed
this case, Judge Barbieri first outlined the three types of ISPs that exist:
19. Alberto Garay, Federalism, the Judiciary, and Constitutional Adjudication in Ar-
gentina: A Comparison with the U.S. Constitutional Model, 22 U. MIAMI IN-nVR-
AM. L. Ri-v. 161, 186 (1991).
20. Cabanellas, supra note 12, at 449.
21. CONs-r. ARG. art. 31; Garay, supra note 19, at 198.
22. COo. PROC. Civ. Y COM. [CivIL AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODEr] art. 34, cl.
4. (1988) (Arg.).
23. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 7.
24. Id. at 23-24.
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id.; Decreto 1279/97, Nov. 25, 1997 B.O., 1, available at http://www.abgra.org.ar/
documentos/pdf/lInternet Dec_1279.pdf.
27. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 10.
28. Id. at 8.
29. Id. at 12.
30. COD. Civ. [CIvIL CODE] art. 1113 (Arg.).
31. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 12.
32. CoD. Civ. [CIvIL CoiE] art. 1109 (Arg.).
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(1) Internet access providers, such as "Dial-up, Edge, ADSL, [or] Cable
m[o]dem," 33 (2) hosting service providers that store and publish content
online for clients, and (3) search engines that locate content on the In-
ternet based on search parameters defined by the user.34 After determin-
ing that Google Inc. and Yahoo! Argentina belong to the third category,35
Judge Barbieri held that the appellants could only be subjectively respon-
sible because the content that the search engines displayed was not cre-
ated, edited, or uploaded onto the network by them.36
Article 1109 of the Argentine Civil Code, when read in conjunction
with Article 512, places responsibility upon a party when a failure to act,
or an omission, results in a damage.37 Therefore, the question arose as to
what the appellants actually did or failed to do that created their liability
in this suit.3 8 Judge Barbieri reminded the court that the appellants were
not responsible for the illegal content and that even the expert witness in
the lower court confirmed that anonymous third parties uploaded the ille-
gal content.39 Further, by making the distinction between the search en-
gines and the Internet access providers, Judge Barbieri stated that if any
party should be liable for the harm to the actress, it should be the service
operators because they are in the position to upload the material onto the
network, know the identities of their clients, and exercise vigilance and
control over their domains to make sure that nothing illegal is posted on
the Internet.40 With regard to the omission, Judge Barbieri stated that
preceding any civil liability, the search engines must have known about
the illegal content and must have subsequently failed to take the appro-
priate action that would eliminate that content or end the culpable party's
activity.4 1 Quoting Fernando Tomeo, Judge Barbieri states that if the so-
cial network was not notified of the illegality, it cannot be responsible for
them even if those contents can be found on its own website. 42 To hold
otherwise would place an undue burden on that social network to moni-
tor and moderate millions of websites, images, commentaries, and opin-
ions that might be found on the Internet. 43
Judge Barbieri considered U.S., European, and Spanish law in deter-
mining that ISPs are immune from liability for the illegal content third
parties publish.44 Judge Barbieri pointed to the U.S. Communications
33. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 13.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 14.
36. Id.
37. CoN. Civ. [Civii CoDE] arts. 512, 1109 (Arg.).
38. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 16.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 17.
41. Id. at 19.
42. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 19 (citing Fernando Tomeo, Las Redes




44. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 20-21.
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Decency Act of 2006 that states that "[n]o provider or user of an interac-
tive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider." 45 She
also referenced Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council that states that a service provider is not liable when transmit-
ting a communication so long as the provider (1) does not originate the
transmission, (2) does not select the beneficiary of the transmission, and
(3) does not change or choose the information contained within the trans-
mission.46 Article 15 of this directive further provides that member states
are barred from obligating ISPs to monitor the information that they
transmit, though the member states have the option of establishing a duty
upon the ISPs to inform the proper authorities about existing illegal con-
tent.4 7 Finally, Judge Barbieri cited a more conservative Spanish law that
places more responsibility on the ISPs to act with due diligence in either
the elimination of, or limited access to, illegal content to avoid liability
for the actions of a third party.48
Before rendering her final vote in support of the appellants, Judge Bar-
bieri specifically mentioned Google's terms and conditions.4 9 The terms
and conditions explicitly state that the information that a user receives
through the use of Google's search engine is the sole responsibility of the
person who created it, that Google responds to notifications of alleged
violations of authorship rights in accordance with the international intel-
lectual property law, and that Google reserves the right to cancel the ac-
counts of repeat offenders.50 Using the law cited throughout her opinion
and the terms and conditions that Google already has in place, Judge Bar-
bieri stated that the only options available to Virginia da Cunha for her
injuries are either to contact Google herself and give them the names of
the websites that contain the illegal content, or bring the creators of the
websites themselves to court. 5 1
C. THE DISSENT
The dissenting vote in this case offers insight into the intricacy of the
decision. Judge Diego C. Sanchez began by stating that freedom of ex-
pression, as a characteristic of a free society, is important, but he also
cited the American Convention on Human Rights that protects every in-
dividual's right to honor and dignity.5 2 Although he champions the pro-
hibition of prior censorship, he realized that there are certain limits to
45. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2010); Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 20.
46. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000, art. 12, 2000 O.J. (L 178), available at http://www.ebu.chlCMSimages/en/legL
ref ec directive e commerce_080600_tcm6-4338.pdf.
47. Id. art. 15.
48. Servicios de la Sociedad de la Informaci6n y de Comercio Electr6nico art. 17
(B.O.E. 2002, 34).
49. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 22.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 22-23.
52. American Convention on Human Rights art. 11, Nov. 22, 1969, No.17955.
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one's freedom of expression.53 According to Judge Sanchez, the primary
role of these search engines is to facilitate a user's access to different
Internet websites through programs designed by humans that select and
order a search and then display findings based on their defined parame-
ters. 54 Although the majority argued that the search results are a func-
tion of the user's input,55 Judge Sanchez demonstrated how the search
engines' algorithms determine what websites and what links are
presented to the user; and, because of their abilities to prevent results
that contain certain words from surfacing on the results displayed, he fur-
ther demonstrated that the search engines are in the ideal position to
prevent any eventual injury.56 The heart of Judge Sanchez's argument
was that the search engines put themselves in the position of displaying
all suggested results, in accordance with the user's input and the system's
algorithms, and once the damaging content is displayed, the search en-
gines become the cause of the injury.57
Judge Sanchez followed the logic of Judge Barbieri and Judge Serrat,
conceding that an ISP is only liable when it has knowledge of the damag-
ing and illegal content, but still found the ISPs liable.58 He pointed out
that Google Inc. was notified of Virginia da Cunha's suit against it and
Yahoo! in 2006 and yet the damaging content, both links and images, was
accessible through the search engine website until the beginning of 2010
through the date of the decision, over three years after being notified of
the illegal content.59 Accordingly, Judge Sanchez found such inaction rel-
evant to liability and ultimately intolerable. 60
III. THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
As stated earlier, due to Argentina's civil law tradition, courts do not
strictly adhere to the concept of stare decisis but rather follow laws;61
instead of applying the laws to the cases as they arise, courts apply the
cases to the laws.6 2 The lower court noted that when existing law cannot
determine an issue, judges may use analogous laws to reach a conclu-
sion.63 Furthermore, it is established that a judge cannot avoid deciding a
matter by claiming that the laws are "silent, obscure, or insufficient." 6 4 In
this instance, the majority erred in its determination for two main rea-
sons. First, the judges failed to address the search engines' objective re-
sponsibility by claiming that no risk was created on their part. Second,
53. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 30-31.
54. Id. at 35-36.
55. Id. at 14.
56. Id. at 35-36.
57. Id. at 40-41.
58. Id. at 55-56.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 56.
61. Garay, supra note 19, at 186.
62. Id.
63. COD. Civ. [CIVIL CODE] art. 16 (Arg.); Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 7.
64. CoD. Civ. [CIVIL CoDE] art. 15 (Arg.).
DON'T SHOOT THE MESSENGER
although the majority claims that personal knowledge of the illegal con-
tent is required before a duty arises, by avoiding discussion of the details
and intricacies of the searches that both engines conduct,65 the judges
failed to address the actions of the defendants during time between the
commencement of the initial action in 2006 and the date that the appeals
decision was rendered in August of 2010. During this period, Google
failed to remove or reduce accessibility of any of the injurious websites,
links, or images.66
A. THE SEARCH ENGINES HAD OBJECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
In the instance where harm is caused by a created risk, there is a rebut-
table presumption of responsibility on the creator of that risk; to rebut
that presumption, the creator must show that he had no fault in the in-
jury.67 The majority incorrectly applied this law because it assumed that
the risky object in the matter was the computer 68 and, therefore, did not
explore whether the appellant successfully rebutted the presumption. 69
The risky object was actually the display page of the search engines' re-
sults, as that is what caused the harm to Virginia da Cunha-seeing these
links and images on the search results page when she entered her name.70
Had the majority reached the rebuttable presumption stage in its analysis,
it would have found that the appellants would still be liable because they
facilitated access to the illicit material and disclosed a harm that would
not have occurred but-for the search engines' actions.71
The majority made an incorrect leap in its discussion regarding the
search engines' role in this matter.72 The judges erroneously believed
that because the expert witness in the trial referred to the search engines'
role of "analyzing the content"73 as a technical phrase used in the process
of digitally storing information, the entire process is done through a com-
puter with no human intervention.74 Immediately after taking this posi-
tion, the majority stated, "there is no doubt but to conclude that the
responsibility of the search engines must be analyzed in light of article
1109 of the Civil Code."75 Because this article does not have a presump-
tion against the appellants, the judges apply it and bypass discussion of
65. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 14-15 (citing the testimony of the expert
witness and his discussion on third parties' ability to create meta tags, but not
discussing testimony about search engines' designs later cited by Judge Sanchez).
66. Id. at 55-56.
67. COD. CIV. [CIVIL CODE] art. 1113 (Arg.).
68. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 14.
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 15, 35-36 (comparing Judges Barbieri and Serrat's belief that no human in-
tervention is involved with Judge Sanchez's determination of human-designed pro-
grams required for search engine capabilities).
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the search engines' participation in the injury caused. 76 Consequently,
they focused their energies on stating that the search engines are not the
ones who created or edited the illicit websites or were even responsible for
displaying them in their search engine results.77
Judge Sanchez, however, recognized that there are several aspects of
human programmer intervention even within the user's search due to the
designers' programs and the parameters that are defined by those design-
ers.78 Further, the majority did not take into account that humans evalu-
ate the relevance of the different results.79 Harder to justify is the
majority's statement that the search engines are not responsible for the
display of the illicit websites, even when their own programs are the ones
that suggest them and the display is the programs' core purpose.80 The
search engines place themselves in the risky position of potentially dis-
closing harmful information, though initially created by a third party, due
to their function as facilitators.81 The dissent correctly states that it is this
facilitation that causes the harm, for if search engines did not perform this
activity, or did so with more care, the danger never would have
occurred. 82
B. THE SEARCH ENGINES HAD THE REQUISITE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ILLICIT CONTENT TO BE LIABLE
Assuming that the majority was correct in applying article 1109 of the
Civil Code and that it was correct in stating that the third party website
editors were liable as those who subjectively caused the damage, the
search engines would still be liable because they were aware of the illicit
material in their display page, yet they failed to remove it.83 Three years
passed between the notice of the lawsuit against them and this recent
opinion, during which time the images and links remained on display
through the search engines' results screens. 84 Regardless of any argu-
ment that could be made in its defense, this is the only fact necessary to
find the search engines liable.85
C. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR ARGENTINA AND THE SURROUNDING
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
This case will undoubtedly impact the manner in which liability is
placed on ISPs. Although this case does not create precedent, the attor-
76. Id. at 35-36 (Judge Sanchez argues this point and provides in-depth analysis).
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id. at 35-36.
79. See generally CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING ET AL., INTRODUCiON TO INFORMATION
RiE-RIEVAL 121 (2007).
80. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 13.
81. Id. at 40-41.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 41.
84. Id. at 55-56.
85. Coo. Civ. [CiviL CoiDE] arts. 512, 1109.
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neys for Virginia da Cunha have already declared their intent to bring the
issue before Argentina's Supreme Court, so the case has the potential of
becoming precedent if the Supreme Court decides to hear it and affirms
the appellate court's decision.86 The holding in this case has three main
implications: (1) it could encourage legislators to pass a current bill that
effectively protects search engines,87 (2) it has far-reaching consequences
for other social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Mys-
pace,88 and (3) freedom of expression has seemingly gained much more
power.89
Though it has been established that the search, reception, and diffusion
of information is protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression, 90 both the majority and the dissent discuss the lack of legal
standards regarding ISPs' liability in particular.91 This ruling, with its in-
escapable broadening of freedom of expression as it applies to ISPs, can
be seen as championing the bill presented by the President of the Com-
mission of Systems, Communication Media, and Freedom of Expression,
Senator Guillermo Jenefes. 92 The senator's bill would codify this ruling
because it states that ISPs, including search engines, only have a duty to
act when they are notified about illegal content and must take all the
appropriate measures to impede access to the illegal content upon notifi-
cation. 93 The bill further states that the determination of what is and
what is not objectively illegal will be up to the determination of the judici-
ary, so the courts will be an integral part in the implementation of this
bill, if it is passed as law.9 4 This particular ruling is especially important
because of the number of celebrities that have filed lawsuits against
search engines that have also damaged their reputations and rights to
privacy. 95
The far-reaching consequences of this decision are also not lost on the
social networking websites, particularly Facebook. 96 This decision, if
codified into law, would allow Facebook to escape any liability if any per-
son who has a Facebook account in Argentina chose to upload injurious
content or illegal pictures, as long as Facebook had no knowledge of the
content.97 Finally, the broadening of freedom of expression in Argentina
86. Vinod Sreeharsha, Google and Yahoo Win Appeal in Argentine Case, N.Y. TIMFS,
Aug. 19, 2010, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/technology/
internet/20google.html.
87. Fernando Tomeo & Roberto Abieri, Responsabilidad de los Buscadores de Internet
[The Responsibility of Internet Search Engines], 3-4 (2009), http://www.aftabo-
gados.com.ar/pdf/RESPONSABILIDAD%20DE%20LOS%20BUSCADORES
%20DE%20INTERNET.pdf.
88. See generally Tomeo, supra note 42.
89. See Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 16.
90. Id. at 8 (citing Ley 26.032/05).
91. Id. at 34-35 (citing Simari, supra note 8).
92. Tomeo, supra note 87, at 3.
93. Id. at 3-4.
94. Id. at 4.
95. Id. at 1.
96. Tomeo, supra note 42, at 4.
97. Id. at 7.
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in the past two years, culminating in this recent decision, has not gone
unnoticed. In September of last year President Cristina Fernandez pro-
posed a bill to decriminalize libel and slander98 and then in November of
the same year, criminal defamation was appealed. 99 Soon after the Presi-
dent's statements, other South American countries, including Columbia,
Costa Rica, and Chile, followed the Argentine president's guidance and
dismissed criminal charges pending against journalists.10' Because of the
trend that is appearing in South America, due to Argentina's broadening
of freedom of expression, this ruling might start another trend among
South American countries.' 0
IV. CONCLUSION
This decision has expanded freedom of expression by placing a duty on
search engines only upon being notified of an illegality.102 The dissent
persuasively argued that search engines do have a hand in the results that
are displayed on its webpage, but this was insufficient to cause an affirm-
ance of the lower court's decision. 03 The widespread implications of this
decision will ultimately tilt the law in favor of freedom of expression and
neglect the individual and personal rights that each person possesses. 104
By having the Supreme Court make the final determination, not only will
this matter be put to rest, but also the proper guidelines that the court
will provide will undoubtedly assist future cases with insight on the civil
liability of ISPs.1 o5
98. President Cristina Fernandez, Speech Given in Commemoration of 30 Years of the
Visit of the Commission on Human Rights in Argentina (Sept. 11, 2009) (tran-
script available at http://www.casarosada.gov.ar/index.php?option=com-content&
task=view&id=6375).
99. Carlos Laurfa, Posting on Criminal Defamation Eliminated in Argentina, TIHE-
CommiTFE TO PRo-TCr JOURNALISTS, (Nov. 19, 2009, 12:03 PM ET), http://cpj.
org/2009/1 1/criminal-defamation-eliminated-in-argentina.php.
100. Jos6 Barbeito, Latin America Takes Steps Against Criminal Defamation, TiHE COM-
MITIEE TO PROITC JOURNALISTS, (Feb. 26, 2010, 5:33 PM ET), http://cpj.org/
biog/2010/02/latin-american-rulings-steps-against-criminal-defa.php#more.
101. Id.
102. Da Cunha, La Ley [L.L.] (2010-E-107) at 16.
103. See generally id. at 35-36
104. See generally id. at 47 (Judge Sanchez's dissent).
105. Garay, supra note 19, at 198.
